04.09.2006 STOP MALAKHOV!


Representatives of the older generation (unfortunately, there are not many of them in the Net) remember an explosive article with the same title; the title became a common noun. Nobody remembers who was that Malakhov and what was his guilt, but the idea to stop him and the likes really held everybody in thrall. Therefore I beg the perdon of young and exceptionally strong grandmaster Malakhov in advance for accidental use of his name. We will discuss a fashionable systematic point of view on recent failures of our national team, including the latest shameful result at the Turin Olympiad. This point of view was presented (or ‘dubbed’ – a word popular in Mikhail Gorbachev times) by Malakhov at the Trainers’ Council and then in his article published in 64. However, I will try analyzing the whole spectrum of opinions on the matter, emphasizing those ‘advocating devil’, i.e., defending the leadership of the team and blaming specific team members (apparently, former members already). Their statements as well as Malakhov’s ones are openly demagogical. An innocent example to begin with:

‘Let us take a look at the Olympic lineup. Bareev and Rublevsky turned out being in poor shape, and one cannot call it surprising. At least one of them could have been replaced. Svidler had played a very tiring tournament in Sofia prior to the Olympiad, and in Turin he lacked strength in the concluding rounds. One could perhaps select a player more fresh. Morozevich had had a vacation in Australia, and failed to acclimatize in Italy. One could prohibit him flying to another hemisphere, and replace if he disobeys. (...) Thus, the winning chances of our team were forfeited already before the tournament. And it is always easy to find the guilty afterwards. Dolmatov, for instance.’

So, four out of six team members are mentioned as replacement candidates. Each particular statement is reasonable, but if you put them together, you get nonsense. Four out of six! It is also inconsistent nonsense – team leader Vladimir Kramnik could also be regarded as a replacement candidate (like Botvinnik in 1952), because his play in the last couple of years was too unimpressive. Flying to Australia or playing in Sofia are serious offenses of course, but Alexander Grischuk’s refusal to play in the Superfinal due to ‘unsatisfactory’ first prize clearly calls for a red card. Therefore, all six of them can be ruled out. How to proceed with team selection in order not to forfeit the winning chances already before the tournament?

So, Sergey Dolmatov (and Alexander Bakh and all others) are not guilty – unless the head coach is given unlimited power, ‘like it is practicised in many sports, for instance, in football... The trainer alone makes decisions about the lineup and disciplinary demands... Only under such leadership the team will perform to its maximum’.

Demagogics again! Unlike football, chess is an individual sport, and the match result is made by combined individual scores. The national team must be open for all objectively strongest players, and when this rule is broken, the results decline, like it was in the team USA without Fischer and Reshevsky playing together. While in the team USSR Karpov and Karparov (but not other way round!) stood shoulder to shoulder. It does not matter whether the trainer likes or dislikes you; if you are a world champion (or Russian champion), the spot for you must be guaranteed! How can trainer’s feelings and fears about Rublevsky’s poor form outweigh his title and justify replacing him by Malakhov, who failed to qualify for the Superfinal from the Higher League? Why the Russian championship was revived then?

Even if we forget about ground for corruption (which is inevitable under the head coach unlimited power), such practice is clearly wrong. It is more so that it was implemented already in the most discouraging way. A much more successful national team head coach, Boris Postovsky, explained his decision to replace reigning Russian champion Alexander Khalifman (who became the world champion in two year) by Sergey Rublevsky as follows: Khalifman is unstable, while Rublevsky (attention!) ‘caught his form in the last three rounds of the German league’… The team of Postovsky won that time, but it does not justify a crying willfulness of the manager.

One cannot help but agree with Bareev that a lucky win at the world championship in Israel does not justify the manager, who remained in the team after a shocking failure at the European championship in Sweden. With all due respect, Sergey Dolmatov had to be fired, like excellent football coach Georgy Yartsev had to be fired after Russia’s 1-7 loss to Portugal. The trainers kept their position in both cases; we were lucky in Israel, the second place at the previous Olympiad was written off due to inspired play by Ukraine, but Turin cleared the things up.

‘Is there a difference between 2nd and 22nd place? – rhetorically asks Malakhov. – I think there is no difference for Russia.’ And again, he is not exactly lying (although he is lying), but assists those who want to avoid responsibility for poor team management. Dolmatov’s illness is a partial excurse for him, but not for those who sent a sick person to Turin. Malakhov has just explained us that ‘the probability of winning the gold was close to zero’, so why he is so disparaging about silver or bronze medals? And aren’t professional sportsmen supposed to struggle to a bitter end for glory of their country? And aren’t trainers supposed to motivate them?

What are the duties of a national team trainer? Not forming the team, and not choosing the order of boards – fortunately, there are objective criteria in chess (however, one of them – rating – is doubtful; more of it later), so one can solve this small problem in five minutes without trying to outsmart the opponents. Strategic goals are easy to define – Russia always plays for the first place, and if taking the first is for some reason impossible, switches to the best possible goal in such an offending case.

However, tactics and lineup for each specific match, sharp opponent-specific opening preparation, and timely draw offers are direct responsibilities of the trainer (and captain) of a national team. There are no global or systematic issues, which are so eagerly discussed by Dolmatov and his well-wishers – this is how the points and half-points are saved and won! These points and half-poitns result in won matches, which make an overall victory possible (or impossible). Could each of those players, regardless of their form, score point or point and a half more, provided the successful team management as described above? Yes, they could!

Would it secure the overall victory? Yes, it would! End of story; everything else including so-called Bareev’s betrayal (was he losing on purpose?) is meaningless.

I recall Dolmatov’s directions prior to a decisive match against China at the world championship: ‘Press with White, complicate with Black!’ Not too coplicated, you know.

Picking players for the team according to rating, even if certain rating, as Malakhov puts it, raises doubts. Rating has inertia. Participants of all-play-all tournaments have a bit inflated rating compared to Swiss regulars. Rating reflects games with different control and in different kinds of competitions. A knock-out system also complicates the matter. Finally, this goes against our historic tradition: the team must consist of world champions, WC runners-up, and Russian champions, and nobody else.

What is the ideal lineup for the Russian team? What was it before Turin? Kramnik qualifies as a world champion by one version. Svidler qualifies as bronze medalist of the world championship in Argentina. Morozevich was 4th at the WC. Rublevsky qualifies as a Russian champion. This is an obligatory list. And talking about the rest of the team, we have just three candidates for two spots: Grischuk (4th place in the FIDE Cup), Bareev (5th place in the FIDE Cup and Russian championship) and Jakovenko (runner-up of the Russian championship). Jakovenko is the only player who objectively could replace Bareev or Grischuk in the team. This is the only disputable spot! The rest of the failure comes from lost half-points, sickness and confusion of the trainer, excessive piety before Kramnik and his personal ambition. An outside observer could get the feeling that Kramnik’s performance was more important for the team leadership than overall result of the team. All this resulted in 22nd place.

Dolmatov is either fired or not; more precisely, he is fired, but returned, and fires at Bareev; Bakh fights on ten fronts; the leadership of the chess federation explain the failures by weakness of the players and mostly by the fact that too few federation employees are allowed to visit FIDE Congresses; grandmaster Malakhov, who formulated their moods so nicely, heads the Russian team in China; the match is lost; Malakhov scored 50% and will remain in the team for years to come.

Correct me if I am wrong.